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A Long Wave Event 
HIV/AIDS, Politics, Governance and “Security”: Sundering the 
Intergenerational Bond? 
 
Tony Barnett12 
London School of Economics 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There is a disharmonious resonance between the life cycle of the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus and that of its human host.  In heavily affected 
countries, many people live long enough to reproduce and then die, leaving 
behind numerous orphans.  This process has implications that we do not 
understand. While some foresee social disorder arising from legions of poorly 
socialised and unruly children grown to adulthood, the evidence is far from 
clear.  Those arguments and the evidence are reviewed here, particularly in 
relation to the links between premature death and electoral processes in 
Southern Africa. 
 
                                                 
1 Tony Barnett is Economic and Social Research Council Professorial Research Fellow at the 
Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics.  He has been researching the 
impact of HIV/AIDS since 1986 (publishing AIDS in Africa: its present and future impact (with 
Piers Blaikie) in 1992) and is co-author with Alan Whiteside of AIDS in the 21st Century: 
disease and globalisation, 2002, fully revised and updated edition to be published April 2006. 
2 My thanks to the following for most useful and informed comments on an earlier draft: 
Colette Clement, Sarah Knights, Bill Rau, Janet Seeley. 
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Twenty years or more ago the question of whether or not the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic was going to have “impacts” was widely disputed.  Now we know 
differently. Those impacts exist, are poorly understood, and may have serious 
long-term consequences. We can either be aware we need to confront these 
some time in the future or, better, try to avoid them by taking action now.   
Acting now and in the near future to avoid impacts will save lives and suffering 
in other countries.  As well as meeting these altruistic goals, such actions may 
even be in the long term self interest of donor countries. Whether or not these 
impacts include “security” effects, what these effects might be, whom they 
might affect, and how and why are all important questions to which we have 
few answers and little evidence on which to base our answers. My colleague 
at LSEAIDS, Gwyn Prins, recently reviewed some aspects of the HIV/AIDS 
and security agenda in these pages3 and elsewhere in this issue we describe 
some of the problems of evidence associated with these questions. 
 
Here I do two things: (a) discuss the existing evidence and argument and 
conclude that we cannot easily draw any clear link between the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and “security”; (b) explore the issue of AIDS, politics and “security” 
from the perspective of the deep relations between the nature of the 
pathogen, its social effects and the resultant political processes and consider 
what we might possibly say about issue of HIV/AIDS and “security”.   
 
Security is a troubling and greatly evocative word. It can be taken to refer to 
the individual, communities, states or, most generally, the global community.  
Most often it is applied to states, and it is mainly in this sense that it is used 
here.  However, such usage has dangers, not least neglect of other possible 
meanings, and also its linkage to a variety of events, such as an HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, in which the effects of these events are discussed as though their 
greatest and perhaps only importance is because they supposedly pose a 
threat to a particular state or group of states.  In so doing, others meanings 
may be obscured or their importance neglected.   There is a danger that this 
is happening in that some commentators are apt to draw too direct and simple 
                                                 
3 G. Prins, AIDS and Global Security, International Affairs, 80, 2004, 931-52 
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a link between HIV/AIDS and security – and that on the basis of little solid 
evidence4. 
 
HIV and Humans: a disharmonious resonance 
To begin with, we must attend to the evident disharmonious resonance 
between the life cycle of the virus, the length of infection in the individual 
human host and the length of a human generation.  Put briefly, an infected 
person has children, these are orphaned and may grow up to become 
infected, but not before they have themselves had children – who are 
orphaned in turn.  Hence a basic unit of social structure in most human 
societies, the three generation bond between grandparents, parents and the 
current generation – and on into the future – is rent asunder.  Given mean life 
expectancies and reproductive cycles, such a bond probably spans about 70 
years with variation depending on life expectancy and reproductive outcomes.  
In the absence of effective, sustainable and available ARV (antiretroviral) 
treatment regimens, a vaccine or behaviour change, this happens repeatedly.  
Moreover, this process should be read against the possible threat of 
developing viral resistance to existing ARV regimens when these are used 
widely in “resource constrained” – for which read poor and ill-resourced – 
settings where sustainability is dependent on donor commitment.  There are 
two kinds of resistance, acquired resistance which manifests itself in an 
individual patient and is resistance to their particular drug regimen. Such 
resistance to individual ARVs or whole classes of ARVs is seen in as many as 
20 per cent of patients seen in the UK and the US.  In Thailand, recent reports 
suggest the appearance of widespread resistance to locally produced 
versions of Lamivudine, Nevirapine and Stavudine5, 6.  This is not only 
resistance to the individual drugs but also to whole classes of these drugs.  
Second, and more worrying, is the possibility of viruses which have acquired 
resistance to particular ARVs or classes of ARVs being transmitted between 
                                                 
4 This is most clear in the US administration documents cited below, and also and most 
recently in Garrett, L., HIV and National Security: Where Are the Links?, US Council on 
Foreign Relations July 18, 2005 
5 The Nation (Thailand), 15 July 2005 
6 Personal communication from Dr. Wasun Chantratita 
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people: this is transmitted resistance.  The current evidence on this is very 
limited7,8,9,10, 1112. 
 
The epidemic is producing very large numbers of orphans in poor and 
politically fragile societies13. Children brought up in difficult circumstances 
develop a pragmatic and short term survival perspective14,15.  Furthermore, 
behavioural change messages about HIV/AIDS may have the unintended 
consequence of stigmatising the parental generation who are seen by their 
children as having acted sinfully and to have breached taboos.  In many 
societies, and perhaps pronouncedly in Africa, respect for the ascendant 
generation is said to be a central cultural value.  In such places and against 
the background of stigma, the intergenerational structural break may appear 
as loss of respect for elders in general: this at a time when rapid change is in 
any case already contributing to that process. In these circumstances, this 
breach is combined with an un-moderated pragmatic orientation towards the 
world, a rational orientation for children and young people who in any case 
are hard-pressed merely to survive from day to day. This may have 
substantial implications for social and political relations at the household, 
community, and ultimately the national level when these inadequately 
socialised people reach adulthood.  Some observers of these processes see 
                                                 
7 Baggaley, R., Ferguson, N.F, Garnett, G.P., The epidemiological impact of antiretroviral 
use predicted by mathematical models: A Review, Imperial College, in Emerging Themes in 
Epidemiology, BioMed Central, 2005, Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2005, 2:9 
(10 September 2005) 
8 O'Rourke, M. (2005). A Single Case of Multidrug-Resistant HIV and Rapid Disease 
Progression, AIDS Clinical Care http://aids-clinical-
care.jwatch.org/cgi/content/full/2005/0301/1 
9 Smith, S.M. (2005). New York City HIV superbug: fear or fear not? Retrovirology, 2(14) 
http://www.retrovirology.com/content/2/1/14 
10 Wainberg, M.A. (2004). The emergence of HIV resistance and new antiretrovirals:are we 
winning? Drug Resistance Updates, 7, 163-167. 
11 Little S.J., et al., Antiretroviral-Drug Resistance among Patients Recently Infected with HIV 
New England J. Medicine, 2002;347:385-394 
12 UK Group on Transmitted HIV Drug Resistance, Time trends in primary resistance to HIV 
drugs in the United Kingdom: multicentre observational study, British Medical Journal, 
November 2005, pp. 1-6 
13 For a global account, see: UNAIDS/UNICEF/USAID, Children on the Brink 2004: A Joint 
Report of New Orphan Estimates and a Framework for Action, New York UNICEF, 2004. 
14 I am grateful to Dr Roland Msiska for this insight derived from his long term observation of a 
group of street children in Lusaka. 
15 For an extraordinary, country specific and disturbing account of the traumatising effects of 
the AIDS epidemic on orphans, see the recent unpublished PhD thesis by Marguerite Daniel, 
Hidden Wounds and Lost Dreams: orphanhood, exigency and the culture of silence in 
Botswana, University of East Anglia, Norwich, 2005.   
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these orphans as a threat to local and international order.  Bluntly put, those 
who are orphaned may be indifferent to prevailing norms and values, or look 
for salvation in millenarian and fundamentalist beliefs of one kind or another, 
and may ultimately do this with assistance from a Kalashnikov or a bomb.  
There is as yet little evidence to suggest that this is happening or that it will 
happen but it is a view which is held by some of those who determine foreign 
policy in, for example, the United States. For these reasons, the implications 
of large scale orphaning and its relation to security do merit examination.  
 
A recent comprehensive and relatively measured report by the South African 
Institute for Strategic Studies says:  
 
“The HIV/AIDS epidemic will cause major social changes in Southern 
Africa, and will most likely change the face of communities and 
societies in ways that we now find hard to imagine. In particular, the 
long-term consequences of the trauma many children will experience 
could be severe if adequate psychosocial care and support are not 
provided to all children affected by HIV/AIDS in the region.  16.”17 
 
There should be no doubt that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is extremely serious.  
Its impact is also serious and extends over generations and may have global 
implications. Our response to its challenges raises many important questions 
with which we must engage when we consider (a) what we believe is actually 
happening; (b) what evidence we have for those beliefs; and (c) how we 
develop policies as part of that response.  Whatever the uncertainties, when it 
comes to the implications of the HIV/AIDS epidemic for future politics and 
governance, we must take heed and we must act on the best information and 
advice that we can garner. 
 
What is happening? 
We first became aware of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the early 1980s –
assumed at that time to be confined to gay men in Europe and North America.  
                                                 
16  Germann, S., Call to Action: What do we do?, chapter 5 in: Pharoah, R., ed., A Generation 
At Risk? HIV/AIDS, Vulnerable Children and Security In Southern Africa, Institute For Security 
Studies, Monograph No 109, December 2004, Pretoria, p. 112.  
 
17 It is odd that these authors speak about these changes in the future tense when the 
epidemic is already so old. 
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That was then: fast forward to now. We see a huge epidemic, indeed what 
some prefer to call a pandemic.  It might be more honest to recognise that 
with viable vaccines at least a decade away – and this pessimistic prediction 
has already remained fairly constant for a decade or more – we are really 
living with an endemic.  In other words, HIV/AIDS is not going away in the 
near or foreseeable futures. It will be a constant presence in the lifetimes of 
most of those reading this.    
 
With its awful global reach, present on all continents and reported from every 
country in the world, resulting in millions of infections and millions of deaths, it 
is frequently compared to the Black Death.  Thus,  
“The Black Death … better informs the discussion of HIV/AIDS, though 
it claimed its death toll, featuring the elimination of more than a third of 
the European population, in roughly eighteen months’ time. Because 
the timeline of the Black Death was so short, it is easier to discern the 
impact the Yersinia pestis bacterium had on European societies. 
Striking similarities between HIV/AIDS and the Black Death can be 
seen, including the reshaping of the demographic distribution of 
societies, massive orphaning, labor shortages in agricultural and other 
select trades, strong challenges to military forces, an abiding shift in 
spiritual and religious views, fundamental economic transformations, 
and changes in the concepts of civil society and the roles of the 
state18.” 
 
It is not clear whether the comparison is really useful; but when it is 
associated with a security agenda, it accretes another level of threat which 
may inadvertently associate it with another aspect of the security agenda, “the 
war on terror”.  The combination of AIDS, orphans and terror begins to take 
on an independent life, perhaps regardless of either the strength of the 
evidence or the precise value of the parallel.  In these circumstances, it 
becomes of the greatest importance to understand that HIV/AIDS confronts us 
with a new type of challenge – the challenge of a long wave event and how to 
begin thinking about such events. 
 
Official statistics as published by UNAIDS, the UN agency charged with 
coordinating the global response to the epidemic, are astounding and awful.  
                                                 
18 Garrett, L., HIV and National Security: Where Are the Links?, US Council on Foreign 
Relations July 18, 2005, p. 9. 
FINAL 
 8 
Allowing for margins of error - and the pressures for exaggeration and spin 
born out of the natural demands of advocacy in an ever-more cacophonous 
arena of demands for humanitarian action in a troubled world19,20 -  we must 
not remain unmoved    The current situation is summarised in Table 1.  Even 
given the limitations of current disease surveillance methods and epidemic 
models, these figures are terrifying.  Whether or not a society’s adult 
seroprevalence level is  above 40 per cent (as in three southern African 
countries, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana),  or at 35 per cent, 20  per cent 
or “only” 5 per cent is of importance – but of only limited importance.  These 
are all appalling levels which bode ill for any society. This is a terrible disease 
which kills, slowly, again and again.  In India, estimates of numbers of people 
infected top five million, with a range between 2.5 million and 8.5 million21. If 
the UK had a mortal infectious disease epidemic in where prevalence levels 
were reported by the Health Protection Agency at a fraction of the levels in 
Africa, India22, Papua New Guinea, Ukraine, Russia or a host of other 
countries, something would have to be done!  But the global figures do not 
terrify us enough, we do not comprehend their implications, the reality is 
geographically distant; their implications are distant in time.  We do not attend 
to their implications.  Why is this?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Global summary of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, end 2004 
 
                                                 
19 Barnett, T., Prins, G., Whiteside, A., Aids denial costs lives,  Spectator 25 September 2004, 
pp.20-22  
 
20 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have run seroprevalence studies in various places 
using different methods from UNAIDS and the US Bureau of the Census from whence 
UNAIDS obtains most of its statistics. Their estimates of prevalence have tended to be lower 
than those reported by UNAIDS.  
21 UNAIDS, India: Epidemiological Fact Sheet, Update 2004, UNAIDS, Geneva, 2004. 
22 For example, the astonishing and deeply troubling film by Sorious Samura shown recently 
on Channel 4 (UK):, Living with AIDS, 27 June 05 
FINAL 
 9 
  Estimate Range 
People newly infected with HIV in 
2004 
Total 4.9 million [4.3-6.4] 
 Adults 4.3 million [3.7-5.7] 
 Children 
<15 
640,000 [570,000-
750,000] 
Number of people living with 
HIV/AIDS 
Total 39.4 
million 
[35.9-44.3] 
 Adults 37.2 
million 
[33.8-41.7] 
 Women 17.6 
million 
[16.3-19.5 
million] 
 Children 
<15 
2.2 million [2.0-2.6] 
AIDS deaths in 2004 Total 3.1 million [2.8-3.5] 
 Adults 2.6 million [2.3-2.9] 
 Children 
<15 
510,000 [460,000-
600,000] 
Total number of AIDS deaths since 
the beginning of the epidemic 
Total 21.8 
million 
 
Total number of AIDS orphans* since 
the beginning of the epidemic 
Total 14 million  
Projected total number of AIDS 
orphans by 2010 
Total 25 million  
 
* Defined as children who lost their mother or both parents to AIDS when they were 
under the age of 15 . 
Source: UNAIDS/WHO (2004a)23 
 
                                                 
23 UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS epidemic update: 2004, Geneva, UNAIDS, December 2004 
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There are several reasons why we may not be fearful enough.  The first is 
perhaps scepticism as to the strength of evidence for the epidemic’s impact.  
Is this event actually happening and is it any different from numerous other 
dramatic crises occurring in the world?  The second is that even if we accept 
that it is happening, we do not really know what to do about it24. The third, and 
fundamental problem is we do not really know how to understand such an 
event. This is because it falls into a special class of events containing a small 
number of other slowly unforlding nightmares, one of which is global climatic 
change. Recent debates around the 2005 G8 meeting in Scotland show how 
hard it is to shift the US administration when its short and medium term 
material and political interests are threatened by acknowledgement of the 
seriousness of that possibility even in the face of the strongest scientific 
evidence and consensus25, 26! 
 
A Long Wave Event 
This is a long wave event, one where troubling and large scale effects emerge 
gradually over decades. Many abrupt happenings, “disasters”, have long term 
sequelae.  Long wave events are not the same as these short wave events 
which have long term effects.  The distinction is subtle but important.   
Take an infectious disease with a short incubation period and a high rate of 
mortality – for example cholera.  This has long term effects inasmuch as 
people die and leave others bereft, but the event itself has a short wave form.  
We know that it is happening soon after it begins, we respond to it as best we 
can through public health measures and vaccination and treatment of infected 
and sick people.  Similarly with a natural event such as a volcanic eruption or 
the 2004 Asian tsunami.   Again, the effects were immediate and the need to 
respond was instantly apparent.  But it is not only “natural” events which fall 
into this category – indeed, a large and developed body of thought argues that 
                                                 
24 On these first two, see: Barnett, T. and Whiteside, A., AIDS in the 21st Century: disease and 
globalisation, 2002, Palgrave Macmillan, London and New York. 
25 National Research Council, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions 
Committee on the Science of Climate Change, Washington DC, 2001 
26 Joint science academies’ statement:Global response to climate change, URL: 
http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=13057 
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there is no such thing as a “natural” event27: “natural events” are the result of 
acts of human commission or omission.  The tsunami created a human 
disaster because we had not established the necessary monitoring facilities 
and because the poor live within the flood range more than do the rich; the 
effects of global climatic change threaten future generations because we 
cannot achieve the political consensus to do something about it.    
 
However, long wave events can be clearly distinguished from these.  Apart 
from the HIV/AIDS epidemic, some other events seem to fall into this class. 
They include: global climate change, arsenic poisoning from deep bore wells 
in Bangladesh, and possibly the epidemic of obesity in some societies.  There 
are undoubtedly others: indeed these form the research agenda of the 
recently established MacKinder Centre for the Study of Long Wave Events at 
the London School of Economics.  The point about such phenomena is that 
while they are not necessarily easy to identify at one point in time, they do 
share the following distinguishing features: 
 We are usually unaware of their starting points; 
 By the time we become aware of their presence, dynamic and effects, 
it takes a long time to slow down the process or to stop it – and in 
many cases the event may turn out to be unstoppable; 
 Engagement with their implications and long term ramifications 
requires different and long term thinking from that which is familiar to 
us from experience with short wave events; 
 A central reason these events are difficult to halt is that it is 
enormously hard to get people in positions to act to recognise them, 
mobilise resources for what they are, and take appropriate action. 
Such events fall outside the normal time horizons of politicians and 
business strategists for whom the “long term” usually means five 
years; long wave events are likely to cover many decades and 
probably much longer; 
                                                 
27 Blaikie, P.M., Cannon, T., Davis, I., Wisner, B.,  At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's 
Vulnerability and Disasters , London, Routledge, 2003 
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 Managing the consequences of long wave events makes novel 
demands and our existing experience is not necessarily a good guide 
to how we should respond; 
 Most political and administrative capacities are not established to deal 
with such events; 
 When “discovered”, they are thought of and reacted to as 
“emergencies”, creating a probability that actions taken for good in the 
short term will make the situation worse in the long term. 
HIV/AIDS is just such an event because of the peculiar and particular 
characteristics of the disease pathogen – HIV. 
 
The distinctiveness of HIV 
The relation between the epidemic, its social effects (for example large scale 
orphaning) and possible political outcomes directs us to the pathogen. There 
is a direct route from the characteristics of the pathogen through the course of 
the disease to its effects on human life cycle and intergenerational relations.  
 
HIV is a retrovirus: a fairly small group of viruses where the core is composed 
of RNA (ribonucleic acid) rather than the more common DNA 
(desoxyribonucleic [or deoxyribonucleic] acid) found in other life forms.  The 
significance of this is that multiplication requires that it colonise host cells. In 
this case it is the cells of the human immune system. The virus converts these 
into “factories” producting more viral particles.  In the process the host cell is 
destroyed and many tens of millions of viral particles are expelled into the 
body of the infected person.  
 
The human host’s immune system fights back and over a median period of 
about 8 years28 there is a continuing battle between host immune system and 
viral population. An infected person has greatly varying viral load over this 
period. This influences their infectiousness to other people, their susceptibility 
                                                 
28 Median survival from seroconversion 8.6 years (95%CI 5.6 ->12 years), this was reported in 
a presentation by J Whitworth, LA Shafer, C Mahe, L Van der Paal, Survival since onset of 
HIV infection in relation to background mortality in the Masaka natural history cohort, at a 
conference Empirical Evidence for the Demographic and Socio-Economic Impact of AIDS, 
Durban, March 2003.   
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to other infections and their state of health. A key feature of the virus, its 
translation of RNA to DNA, means it is particularly liable to errors in 
transcription of the genetic code, resulting in a high frequency of “mistakes”.  
These mistakes mean that within the human host, the virus is mutating and 
over time these mutations accumulate.  The result is increased size of the 
pool of viral variation within an individual. It is this which enables the virus to 
outwit the human immune response and also in some cases ARV treatments.    
Because of the typically slow progress from infection to death, this group of 
viruses are described as lentiviruses, slow acting viruses.  Viral mutability and 
the further possibility of recombination of mutated viruses with each other – 
both in individual people and in cases of re-infection of an already infected 
person, with a new viral clade – have serious implications, Particularly 
worrisome is possible development of either acquired or transmitted viral 
resistance where supplies of medication are interrupted and/or treatment 
compliance falls below 95% for other reasons.  
 
The relatively long period that it takes for the HIV to prevail over the host 
immune system has social and economic implications. For much of the time, 
an infected person is in reasonable health and able to function at some 
socially and economically satisfactory level.  They are also, of course, capable 
of sexual relations, and particularly infectious in the period after an initial 
viraemic episode (about 2-12 weeks from infection) and before terminal 
increased viral load sets in – anything between a few months to many years 
after infection.  Depending on the social, cultural and economic environment, 
the reproductive rate29 of each initial infection can be greater or smaller. It is 
important to note that the sexual nature of transmission and the long viral life 
                                                 
29 An epidemic is a rate of disease that reaches unexpectedly high levels, affecting a large 
number of people in a relatively short time.  Whether and how an epidemic develops is linked 
to the reproductive rate of the pathogen.  The gradient, final height and rate of decline of the 
curve is determined by the average number of secondary cases generated by one primary 
case in a susceptible population and the period over which this takes place. This is also 
known as “the basic reproductive number” and represented by the symbol R0 (Anderson and 
May, 1992). In order for an epidemic to be maintained, R0  has to equal 1, in other words 
each person who gets better or dies has to infect one other person. At this point the disease 
is endemic but stable. When R0 > 1, each person infects more than one other person, the 
number of cases will rise. When R0 < 1, then the epidemic will be disappearing. The 
reproductive rate is the number of secondary cases resulting from each primary case.  Where 
this is 0 or <1 infection does not become epidemic.  Where it is >1 epidemic development is 
likely.  The larger the R0 number, the steeper the epidemic curve. 
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cycle (combined with high mutation potential) means that infection is likely to 
occur at an early stage in an individual’s life, perhaps even soon after sexual 
debut, and not necessarily result in illness until children have been conceived 
and born.  Thus, in each individual infection, a host – woman or man - may 
remain alive long enough to reproduce and leave behind offspring who, if not 
infected at birth30, can be infected in the future. Hence there is a pathological 
harmony between the viral and human life cycles.  The full wave length of the 
HIV epidemic curve is probably up to 50 and perhaps 120 years long31.  
Unlike most other infections, this passes from generation to generation and so 
the “normal” epidemic sigmoid curve instead of merely reaching a peak, in the 
absence of marked changes to rates of transmission, receives an additional 
boost as each new generation becomes available for infection.  
 
Such pathological harmony between virus and host reproductive cycles has 
potentially significant social and economic results. And this is all the more the 
case when we consider that each succeeding generation is likely to be born 
into a higher HIV prevalent environment than its parents; the situation is 
exacerbated further as its orphan status – with sub-optimal socialisation, early 
deprivation, poorer life chances – means that in all probability its likelihoods of 
contracting HIV is increased.  Basia Zaba’s simulation of the life-time risk of 
infection among young women in a range of seroprevalent environments32 
shows that in countries where adult seroprevalence is in the range 15-40 per 
cent, a young woman aged 15 has a 50-95 per cent chance of contracting HIV 
infection and dying of AIDS.  Even at the relatively “low” adult seroprevalence 
level of 5 per cent, a young woman’s lifetime risk of contracting HIV is around 
20 per cent.  The risk for young men is higher still.   This has to be seen 
further against the declining life expectancy in countries with generalised 
AIDS epidemics.  In several countries in southern Africa, after decades of 
improvement, life expectancy at birth has now declined from around 60 years 
                                                 
30 Of children born to HIV+ mothers, about 25 per cent are HIV+ after the first two years and 
are actually carrying the virus rather than antibodies to it. 
31 This was suggested by Professor Roy Anderson of Imperial College in a plenary address to 
the XIII World Conference on AIDS, Durban, 2000. 
32 UNAIDS, Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, June 2000, Geneva, UNAIDS,  2000, p. 26 
FINAL 
 15 
to below 50 years and in some cases barely above 35 years33.  Tragic as this 
is, more significant is what Alex de Waal has described as “expectancy of 
adult life”34.  People who grow up in harsh circumstances and surrounded by 
premature death may soon become convinced of the inevitability of their own 
fate.  The expectation that one may not live beyond 25 or 30 years no doubt 
alters one’s perspective on the future and whether there is one at all – and 
thus also on the present.  In other words it dramatically discounts the returns 
on any investments, whether financial, business or personal. Why take out an 
insurance policy, why invest in land, why put money into your children’s 
education, why do anything but live for the present when there is every 
chance that you are either infected or will become infected? This is hardly a 
recipe for “behaviour change”35. The future may look very much like this to 
current orphans in many places where there is a generalised AIDS epidemic.  
And it is important always to consider that seroprevalence rates are not the 
same as AIDS epidemics – they are a peek into AIDS in the future. The worst 
is yet to come. 
 
What does this do to human societies? 
The general situation with regard to the pathological harmony between 
pathogen and human society is outlined schematically in Figure 1.   This 
illustrates the ways in which a generalised epidemic adversely affects the 
potential and actual capacity for a society and economy to reproduce itself in 
a variety of ways including via transmission of knowledge and education, 
through maintenance of social and cultural patterns and via the peopling of 
institutions whether government organs or community infrastructure in 
general.   Figure 1 shows the following: 
1. The resonance between the viral life cycle and the human 
generational cycle. Here we see that generation 1 reproduces 
itself and acts as a host for the HIV pathogen.  As this 
generation dies it leaves orphans. 
                                                 
33 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Divisions, World 
Population Prospects: 2000 revision, New York, 2000 
34 De Waal, A., How will HIV/AIDS transform African governance? African  Affairs, London,  
2003; Vol. 102, pp. 1-23 
35 On this see Barnett, T. and Parkhurst, J., Sex, Abstinence and Behaviour Change, Lancet 
Infectious Diseases, forthcoming 2005 
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2. These orphans enter a world where the risk of infection with HIV 
has increased as the general epidemic curve rises.  In addition, 
as orphans, this generation is also possibly more socially, 
culturally and economically exposed to infection.  
3. Thus the pattern repeats itself, the second generation 
reproduces, but so also does the pathogen, and a third 
generation of orphans is produced.  This generation faces an 
increased risk of infection for the same reasons as did its 
parents – but the risk is increased as general seroprevalence 
rises and social exposure to sexually transmitted infections 
(including HIV) also increases as a result of less adequate 
socialisation, reflecting in part the decreased expectancy of 
adult life of parent generation. 
4. While ARV roll out increases national seroprevalence rates by 
keeping HIV+ people alive, it also reduces overall levels of 
viraemia in those who are HIV+ to below measurable levels.  
This is the good news; but in the background is the possibility of 
increased viral resistance to these medications as ARV roll out 
occurs under sub-optimal circumstances with poor compliance36 
and inadequate health systems.  We can only speculate about 
the significance of this development.  So far experience is very 
limited37. 
 
 
                                                 
36 Paterson, DL, Swindells S, Mohr J, et al. Adherence to protease inhibitor therapy and 
outcomes in patients with HIV infection. Ann Intern Med. 2000. 133(1):21-30. 
37 Keynote Address by His Excellency Mr. Festus G., President Of The Republic Of Botswana 
At the Opening Session of The International AIDS Society Conference On HIV Pathogenesis 
and Treatment, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil 24-27th July 2005, released Sunday 24th Of July 2005 
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Figure 1: HIV/AIDS: Sundering the Bonds of Human Society? 
 
In addition to these processes of disruption, epidemic associated mortality 
affects the demographic structure of a society.  These effects are not uniform 
and will vary from place to place.  For some parts of Africa we have evidence 
of what had happened to population as a result of AIDS deaths. In heavily 
affected regions of Uganda the effects of AIDS could be observed in Rakai 
District as long ago as 1993 – reflected in the census data as shown in Figure 
2.    Figure 3 shows a simulation of Botswana’s population with and without 
AIDS mortality in 2020. 
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Figure 2:   The effect of HIV/AIDS on population in Rakai, Uganda, 
199338. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Low-Beer, D., Stoneburner, R.L. and Mukulu, A  (May 1997),  Empirical Evidence for the 
severe but localised impact of AIDS on population structure, Nature Medicine, Vol. 3 No. 5  
pp. 553 – 557. 
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Projected population structure with and 
without the AIDS epidemic, Botswana, 2020
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Figure 3  Projected population structure with and without the AIDS 
epidemic, Botswana 2020 
 
Of course, initial population structure without AIDS will play a part in any 
outcome. For example whereas the typical base structure in Africa and central 
Asia is characterised by high birth rate and relatively low life expectancy, 
producing a typical demographic triangle, in other regions, such as in Ukraine, 
Belarus and Russia, the base demographic picture is quite different as is the 
economic and political base.  No doubt increased AIDS related mortality will 
have different social and economic consequences as between these two 
regions39 40.   Thus generalisation must be drawn with great care: an AIDS 
epidemic encounters pre-existing histories, cultures and social structures.  
Over generalisation can all too easily lead to hasty conclusions about state 
breakdown, security threats &c.  In fact the long wave of the event, like any 
wave, crashes more or less intensely depending on the depth of the water. 
                                                 
39 UNDP, HIV/AIDS in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States: 
reversing the epidemic - facts and policy options United Nations Development Programme, 
Bratislava, New York and Moscow, February 2004. 
40 Sharp, S., Modelling the Macroeconomic Implications of a Generalised AIDS Epidemic in 
the Russian Federation, Masters Thesis, Department of Economics, University of Colorado, 
May 2002, Boulder. 
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Some societies have deeper, calmer water than do others, they are richer, 
better organised, or in other respects more resilient. 
 
Politics and governance effects 
With these provisos, we can however speculate as to the political and 
governance implications of HIV/AIDS epidemics.  National strategic planners 
have been thinking about the likely security implications of the epidemic for 
some years – with more or less apocalyptic predictions.  In the aftermath of 11 
September 2001,  some political analysts suggested that the projected 42 
million children who will cumulatively have been orphaned by AIDS by  the 
year 2010 are likely to be source of political and social unrest, even a source 
for terrorist recruitment41, 42, 43,.  In 2003, the Pretoria-based Institute for 
Security Studies predicted that the “severe social and economic impact of 
HIV/AIDS, and the infiltration of the epidemic into the ruling political and 
military elites and middle classes of developing countries may intensify the 
struggle for political power to control scarce state resources. Such dynamics, 
even singularly, have the potential to lead to political instability.” 44   Some of 
the more extreme predictions have come from within US administrations, 
thus: 
“AIDS, other diseases, and health problems will hurt prospects for 
transition to democratic regimes as they undermine civil society, 
hamper the evolution of sound political and economic institutions, and 
intensify the struggle for power and resources.”45 
                                                 
41 Steven L. B. Jensen, “Fatal Years: How HIV/AIDS is Impacting National and International 
Security–A Desk Review of the Literature and Analytical Approaches” (Geneva: UNAIDS 
Security and Humanitarian Response Unit, March–April 2004). 
 
42 Martin Schönteich, “The Impact of Communicable Disease on Violent Conflict and 
International Security,” Presentation at the Demographic Association of Southern Africa 
Annual Workshop and Conference, University of the Western Cape, September 24–27, 
2002;  
 
43 P. Fourie and M. Schönteich, “Africa’s new security threat: HIV/AIDS and human security in 
Southern Africa,” African Security Review, 10.4, 2001, pp. 35–36 
 
44 Robyn Pharaoh and Martin Schönteich, “AIDS, Security, and Governance in Southern 
Africa: Exploring the impact,” Occasional Paper No. 65 (Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies, January 2003), cited in Garrett, op. cit. 
 
45 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: a dialogue about the future with non-
government experts, URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/globaltrends2015/ 
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This particular report concluded that the prospects for transition to democratic 
regimes were compromised by HIV/AIDS.  It suggested that epidemic impacts 
may “serve to undermine civil society, hamper the evolution of sound political 
and economic institutions, and intensify the struggle for power and 
resources.”46  And it was just such an assessment which prompted the then 
CIA Director George Tenet to state in February 2003 that:  
 
“The national security dimensions of the virus are plain: It can 
undermine economic growth, exacerbate social tensions, diminish 
military preparedness, create huge social welfare costs, and further 
weaken already beleaguered states. And the virus respects no 
border.”47 
 
All of this is crude and unsupported analysis. It is based on no evidence and 
little theory whatsoever and necessarily arrives at its conclusions through the 
prism of post 9/11 expectations of potential threats to the security of the USA.  
However, rather than rushing to premature conclusions as to “threats to 
national security” or “state breakdown” as a result of HIV/AIDS (rather than 
because of other factors) it is necessary to take a closer look at the processes 
and structures within AIDS affected countries to see what we may discern 
about an unclear future. Such a review should however be made in relation to 
the perspective on pathogen-host relations outlined above. 
 
What do we know about politics, governance and AIDS? 
We have surprisingly little hard information about the effects of HIV/AIDS on 
governance and politics in even the most severely affected countries.  One of 
the few solid pieces of indicative evidence and analysis is to be found in a 
2004 report by Kondwani Chirambo48.    He makes the following observations 
                                                                                                                                            
 
46 Global Trends 2015, op cit. 
47 Curt Anderson, “CIA Director says AIDS Threatens Stability, Economic Health Worldwide,” 
Associated Press, February 11, 2003, cited in Garrett, op. cit. 
 
48 Chirambo, K.,  AIDS and Electoral Democracy:Applying a new lens to election coverage, 
IDASA Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa, June 2004 
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about the influence of HIV/AIDS on politics in southern Africa.  Noting the 
importance of elections as core mechanisms of any system claiming 
democratic credentials, he suggests that illness and death associated with 
HIV could already be affecting electoral systems in Southern Africa.    Looking 
at data from Zambia’s 1991, 1996 and 2001 elections and from sero-
prevalence data available since 1985, Chirambo provides perhaps the most 
convincing if only correlational analysis of the effect of AIDS on an electoral 
system. The study indicates that between 1964 and 1984 there was a total of 
14 bye-elections as a result of death of the incumbent member. This number 
increased to 59 during the period 1984-2003 – when the HIV epidemic first 
took off in that region. And we may want to note that in its earliest phases in 
Africa, HIV infections tended to cluster in wealthier, more mobile men rather 
than in other sections of the population –  wealth, or at least higher spending 
power which is not the same thing, and mobility being characteristic of 
politicians the world over.  Of these 59 deaths, 39 occurred between 1993 and 
2003 – the period of high HIV and AIDS prevalence. Of the 39 MPs who died 
in this time, 15 were in the age range 25-49 and 12 were between 50 and 60 
years old.  Only four were listed as having died from road accidents. Similar 
trends are observed in Zimbabwe, increased numbers of by-elections as a 
result of incumbents’ deaths due to illness.  In the period between the 2000 
parliamentary elections and 2004, Chirambo reports Zimbabwe as holding 14 
by-elections. Eight of these were as a result of “illness”.  The 2002 general 
elections in Lesotho cost R118 million. Since then, the country has already 
held six by-elections, three as a result of MPs dying of unspecified illnesses.   
AIDS seems a likely common factor. 
 
In the region’s core, South Africa, competing with India as the country with the 
largest number of HIV infections, a very serious conclusion might be drawn 
from this kind of analysis.  Could it be that HIV and AIDS are eroding the 
South African electoral base and its supply of parliamentarians?  Evidence for 
this supposition can be found in a recent publication49 which suggests that 
                                                 
49 Strand, P.,  Matlosa,  K.,   Strode, A.,  Chirambo, K., HIV/AIDS and Democratic 
Governance in South Africa: Illustrating the Impact on Electoral Processes, IDASA, Pretoria, 
2004. 
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increasing death rates in the voting age group could explain the downward 
trend in voter turnout over the last three elections in South Africa and also be 
a contributor to political power shifts.  
 
Unusual levels of mortality among the electorate are reflected on the voters’ 
roll via the population register. This shows that between 1999 and 2003 
almost 1.5 million of South Africa’s registered voters were removed from the 
voters’ roll because they had died. This out of a total of 20,674,926 registered 
voters.  In the same time period the number of deaths among registered 
voters increased by 66 percent. In some municipalities mortality increased by 
more than 300 percent in mortality over the four years for women between 30 
and 39 years of age. In Limpopo Province it increased by 160 percent.  
Mortality in age group 30 to 49 increased at a higher rate than in the other age 
groups.   And the effects?   Difficult to arrive at a sure conclusion, but it is 
reported that of the leading political parties in South Africa, the ANC and 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) acknowledge HIV/AIDS as having put some 
strain on their party  structures, creating increased need for replacement of 
cadres who have succumbed to illness or died. Although no severe “functional 
defects” have arisen in the party structures, the loss of seniority and 
experience nevertheless is reported to have reduced parties’ capacities and 
‘intellectual memory’50   
 
None of the above shows dramatic disruption, nor does it show failed state 
syndrome.  But considered against the background provided above, it should 
give pause for thought.  We must not forget that although the HIV epidemic is 
in its third decade, we are still not seeing the full and cumulative social and 
economic impacts of the elevated seroprevalence levels we now read and 
digest (if we do read them) with hardly a blink.  Let me repeat them: 25 per 
cent, 30 per cent, 35 per cent, 40 per cent: these are not the impact of the 
epidemic, they are precursors to that impact. In that light we should think very 
carefully about whether the evidence from southern Africa also provides a hint 
of what lies ahead in terms of political and governance effects.    Of course 
                                                                                                                                            
 
50 Strand et al, op. cit. p. 17. 
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many worst case scenarios can be envisaged. For example differential 
seroprevalence rates as between constituencies and even different 
allocations of ARVs could affect voting outcomes.  There is certainly strong 
and current rumour from Zimbabwe that MDC members have less chance of 
accessing ARVs than do Mugabe supporters. 
 
Even in less than perfect democratic systems, more frequent elections – as 
recorded in parts of southern Africa, combined with a hollowed out electorate, 
as suggested for South Africa, means less experienced and less sophisticated 
electors and legislators.  Declining adult life expectancy, increasing numbers 
of orphans, poorer socialisation, second and third generation orphans, and 
the orphans of orphans of orphans, all of these could constitute tipping points 
in already explosive local mixtures.  What are the possible outcomes?  The 
answer to this question lies not only in the internal operations of individual 
states but also in regional and global forces.   
 
A recent scenario exercise by UNAIDS and Shell51 looked to understand 
African futures with HIV/AIDS. As with all scenarios and given normal 
distributions, there were three predictable outcomes (although some African 
participants evidently would have liked to include more): an optimistic, a 
pessimistic and a middle of the road.  In the pessimistic, Africa goes down the 
tubes and all the bad things currently going on are exacerbated by an out of 
control AIDS epidemic; in the middle scenario, “Africa goes it alone” and 
manages to avoid the worst but the situation is bad, and mortality and 
suffering are high; in the best case, global assistance and African political 
leaders’ wisdom saves the continent from the worst, and while having (as we 
already know) dreadful effects, Africa is saved and saves itself from disaster.   
 
All too predictable, but of interest in relation to the questions we have posed 
about politics, governance and security.   First of all, of course, there is no 
                                                 
51 UNAIDS and Royal Dutch Shell, AIDS in Africa: Three Scenarios to 2025, Geneva, 
UNAIDS, 2005, URL: 
http://www.unaids.org/en/AIDS+in+Africa_Three+scenarios+to+2025.asp 
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“African” or any other political and governance effect of AIDS.  There is likely 
to be a diversity of outcomes on that continent as elsewhere.  As with the 
demographics, the starting point is important.  Possibilities include failed state 
syndrome where hollowing out of effective democratic processes as currently 
found in South Africa, Botswana and a few other countries, leads to disorder, 
regional secession, warlordism and the kinds of political developments 
already apparent in parts of the continent (and not only in Africa) without 
HIV/AIDS.   Could the breakdown of intergenerational links and of political 
trust and systems lead to these effects in South Africa and Botswana?   Well, 
the Prime Minister of the latter foresees serious possibilities. He is on record 
as saying: 
 
“The impact of HIV/AIDS on the population, the economy, and the very 
fabric of our society undermines not only development, but poses a 
serious threat to our security and life as we know it.”52 
 
In South Africa, the government of President Mbeki seems to have left it until 
demands for AIDS treatment become such an urgent political issue they can 
produce violence. The evidence for this is the shooting with rubber bullets of 
ten people in Queenstown on 13 July 200553. These people were protesting 
for ARV treatment.   In such circumstances, issues of trust between 
government and electorate, hollowing out of the electoral process and of the 
legislature, demands for AIDS treatment, external influences, and the long 
term demographic and intergenerational breach effects described above could 
all come together to produce odd and unexpected political results.  But 
perhaps not state breakdown in many cases – or at least not as a result of 
AIDS.  Perhaps more likely among the possible responses is a form of 
authoritarian government – partly as defence of established interests, partly in 
                                                 
52 Economic Commission on Africa, 2004. Statement by H.E. Festus G. Mogae, President of 
Botswana. 
http://www.uneca.org/adf2000/daily_updates/speeches_and_press_releases/120700stat. 
 
53 Treatment Action Campaign Newslletter, Forty Injured, Ten Shot at Peaceful Protest to 
Demand Treatment, 13 July 2005, Cape Town, various sources, including: 
http://outfm.org/News/20050712%20tac%20activist%20shot.html;  
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response to an attempt to do something, partly because the last fifty years 
has stamped authoritarianism into the political culture of much of sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The middle UNAIDS scenario comes out with something like this.  
 
A recent revealing visit to a small African community where AIDS deaths were 
familiar in the early 1980s and where we are now seeing the second and third 
generation of orphans may show a particular possibility.  The parish council 
chairman is in his early thirties. An orphan at seven, he brought himself and 
his younger siblings up together with one older brother.  He is a serious man 
and he has a mission.  He makes it his responsibility to stop the present 
generation of young people from becoming infected.  If he finds them working 
in bars or as fishermen he takes action to compel them back to school.  Not 
much room for “human rights” based approaches here but probably good 
public health nonetheless!  According to him this is an effective strategy. And 
who can condemn him for these actions when between 70 and 90 per cent of 
children in the local schools are orphans?  In a society where candidates for 
political office are being winnowed by the epidemic, how many, like this man, 
might enter local and national politics with commendable intentions and will, 
but take actions which would produce despair in most human rights activists?  
What if the survivors of this epidemic, the orphans or orphans of orphans are 
indeed the main actors on the future national stage?  What if they enter it with 
desperate aims to achieve something to deal with the dreadful effects of this 
epidemic?  What if state structures are so weakened by the epidemic?  What 
if millenarian and syncretistic religious ideologies gain ground54?  And a dozen 
other “what ifs”. Among these and crucial to future thinking are two questions: 
(a)  whether or not sustainable ARV treatment can be made available over the 
long term (b) whether the next generation of such drugs able to confront viral 
resistance can be made readily and cheaply available rather than be subject 
to lengthy bargaining to achieve this necessary end. 
 
While the label “fascist” may seem odd, Karl Polanyi’s description of the 
harbinger ideas of fascism seems somehow apposite to describe aspects of 
                                                 
54 The role of syncretist African Zionist churches in Southern Africa in relation to the HIV 
epidemic is an important area for further research. 
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this possibility. They include: “spread of irrationalistic philosophies, racialist 
aesthetics, anticapitalist demagogy, heterodox currency views, criticism of the 
party system, widespread disparagement of ‘regime’ or whatever was the 
name given to the existing democratic set up”55.  Poor countries are not 
immune to fascism and the BJP movement and its incumbency in government 
in India certainly trod a narrow line in this respect56.   Fascism can be built on 
the basis of diverse ideological and cultural traditions.  But probably as 
important in all of this is not what happens within a country as a result of HIV 
– which in most cases will be only a tipping point factor. Rather it is the stance 
of the external world to those countries with serious current HIV epidemics 
and looming AIDS epidemics. It is with these long wave events that we must 
all engage strategically.  This is the real security issue.  ‘Security’ in a 
globalized world is more than the defence of a ‘homeland’.  Suggestions 
either that AIDS is a threat to “national security” or that it necessarily leads to 
political and governance problems are facile and may be self-fulfilling.  We 
can speculate but we just do not have the evidence on this, either way, for 
sub-Saharan African countries or anywhere else for that matter.  Such simple-
minded perspectives may move national security organs. They fail to engage 
with the key problem of the 21st century: living together on one small, diverse 
and increasingly crowded planetary homeland.  Grasping the real nature of 
the HIV/AIDS long wave and finding meaningful data are necessary ways 
toward assessing what all of this means. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Polanyi, K., 2000, The Great Transformation, Boston, Beacon Press, p. 245. 
56 See Corbridge, S. and Harriss, J., Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and 
Popular Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000 
